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BOOK REVIEW
QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF
MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS. By
Michael 0. Finkelstein. The Free Press. New York. 1978. Pp. xi, 318. $17.95
Reviewed by Elaine W. Shoben*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many cases require legal factfinders to confront questions that are
probabilistic in nature. What is the likelihood that blacks would be under-
represented on jury panels to a certain degree if there was no intentional
exclusion? How great is the chance that a primary election result would be
different if the invalid votes had not been cast? What is the probability
that a driver neglected to set the handbrake carefully if a parked car rolls
down a hill?
Most individuals are remarkably poor estimators of frequencies. People
consistently overestimate the number of airplane crashes and underesti-
mate the number of pathways between two points.' Consequently, when
they are asked to make an intuitive estimate of the probability of a
particular event given its relative frequency, the answers necessarily re-
flect the underlying misestimates. Similarly, when subjective judgments
about numerical processes are made, patterns of objective error are made.
Individuals tend to judge the product of 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 to be larger than
the product of 2 x 3 x 4 x 5, although the actual calculations would prove
them to be objectively identical.2
These fallacies of intuitive estimates may be merely inconvenient in a
card game, but in important legal decisions these subjective answers
provide very poor guides. When the fact-finding process in legal adjudica-
tions involves assessments of probabilities or judgments on numerical
evidence, reliance on rough subjective estimates can produce unfair re-
sults. Judges, administrative bodies, civil and criminal juries are often
asked to make such judgments with little or no guidance on how to
proceed.
Quantitative Methods in Law3 represents the efforts of one legal scholar to
apply mathematical probability and statistics to the solution of a wide
range of legal problems. Michael 0. Finkelstein has republished in book
form a collection of his articles, beginning with his most famous and most
widely cited: the application of mathematical probability to jury discrimi-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois, College of Law. A.B. 1970, Barnard
College; J.D. 1974, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
See Tversky and Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Prob-
ability, 5 Cognitive Psych. 207, 213, 230 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tversky].
2 See discussion of these examples and other related ones at text accompanying notes
55-60 infra.
3 M. Finkelstein, Quantitative Methods in Law: Studies in the Application of Mathematical
Probability and Statistics to Legal Problems (1978).
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nation cases.4 After leading the reader through a series of fascinating
applications of statistical problem solving to an impressively wide range of
legal situations, the book concludes with the final words of one of the
most engaging battles among legal scholars in recent years: the exchange
between Michael Finkelstein and Laurence Tribe on the use of Bayes'
theorem in a criminal trial to assist the jury in integrating probabilistic
evidence with nonnumerical testimony.5
The ideas in Finkelstein's book can be divided into basically two catego-
ries which can be denominated "responsive" and "innovative" uses of
quantitative methods in law. The first, the responsive uses, consists of
those chapters that propose the use of more precise calculation to answer
legal questions already well defined in probabilistic terms. Most promi-
nent in this category is the use of probability theory in jury discrimination
cases. The second category, innovative uses, includes those chapters which
suggest reformulation of the relevant factual questions in a manner com-
patible with Finkelstein's more scientific approach to inquiry. This cate-
gory includes the author's excursions into the areas of weighted voting, 6
economic concentration7 and solvency controls.8 Two miscellaneous chap-
ters, those on wrongful death damages9 and guilty pleas, 10 subject some
common assumptions on those subjects to empirical scrutiny. All of these
uses can be called "quantitative methods," as the title of the book broadly
groups them. The persuasiveness of each of Finkelstein's models, how-
ever, depends on its function. Responsive uses-models suggesting quan-
titative methods to replace intuitive responses to probabilistic legal
I ld., Chapter 2 ("Jury Discrimination"), originally appearing as Finkelstein, The Applica-
tion of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 338
(1966).
' The original article, now Chapter 3 ("Two Cases in Evidence"), of M. Finkelstein, supra
note 3, was: Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 Harv.
L. Rev. 489 (1970). The critique of his approach by Professor Tribe then appeared a year
later. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L.
Rev. 1329 (1971). Finkelstein's reply appeared then as: Finkelstein & Fairley, A Comment on
"Trial by Mathematics," 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1801 (1971). Finally, Tribe's response to the reply
appeared as: Tribe, A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1810
(1971). The reply and response both are republished as the Appendix in M. Finkelstein,
supra note 3, at 288. For a discussion of the use of Bayes' theorem in integrating probabilistic
evidence with nonnumerical testimony, see text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
I M. Finkelstein, supra note 3, Chapter 4 ("Voting"), originally appearing as: Finkelstein &
Robbins, Mathematical Probability in Election Challenges, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 241 (1973).
I d., Chapter 5 ("Economic Concentration"), originally appearing as: Finkelstein & Fried-
berg, The Application of an Entropy Theory of Concentration to the Clayton Act, 76 Yale
L.J. 677 (1967). A response was written to follow this article as: Stigler, Comment, 76 Yale
L.J. 718 (1967). Finkelstein's brief reply appears following the comment: Finkelstein &
Friedberg, Reply to Professor Stigler, 76 Yale L.J. 721 (1967).
I d., Chapter 6 ("Solvency Controls"), originally appearing as: Finkelstein, The Use of Risk
Theory in Framing Solvency Controls for Nonlife Insurance Companies, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev.
730 (1971).
9 Id., Chapter 8 ("Compensation for Wrongful Death"), originally appearing as: Finkelstein,
Pickrel & Glasser, The Death of Children: A Nonparametric Statistical Analysis of Compen-
sation for Anguish, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 884 (1974).
" Id., Chapter 9 ("Guilty Pleas"), originally appearing as: Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis
of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 293 (1975).
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questions-should be more readily acceptable than innovative uses that
suggest redefining the legal approaches to some particular problems.
These distinctions in uses of quantitative methods regrettably are not
salient throughout Finkelstein's book. It is clearly relevant to the reader's
assessment of the merits of each technique to be certain whether the
author is offering new ways of answering old questions or whether he is
asking new questions. Those chapters concerned with innovative uses can
be evaluated best only in the context of the fields they address. Regardless
of whether they offer definitive new solutions to the problems they con-
sider, they provide a fresh perspective to old issues and help to shake one
out of a "fixed mental set" on how to solve particular legal problems. As
such, those discussions are provocative ones for all readers."
This review will focus initially on Finkelstein's responsive use of quan-
titative methods of analysis: quantitative methods to give greater pre-
cision in situations where courts presently rely on intuitive assessments
to answer probabilistic questions. The reason for focusing on the respon-
sive uses is not only that the diversity of the innovative models makes
them unsuitable for single review, but more importantly, that Finkelstein's
crusade against the use of simple intuition to answer factual questions of
probability is an important contribution to the law. These uses should not
be confused with his other creative, but controversial, proposals for
quantitative methods in the law. This review next will address one of
Finkelstein's innovative models: his proposed use of Bayes' theorem in
criminal trials.' 2 Some of the problems with subjective misestimation that
inspired his model may cause his solution to compound the factfinders'
misestimation of probabilities. Throughout both discussions this review
refers to the work of two prominent psychologists who have explored the
nature of subjective misestimates of probabilities when individuals answer
such questions intuitively. Their work underscores the challenge to the
law to avoid fact-finding rules which comport with intuitive estimates but
not with more objective calculations.
II. ERRONEOUS PROBABILITY ASSESSMENTS-THE NEED FOR PRECISION
Some legal questions require as part of the fact-finding process an
assessment of a particular probability. Such analysis has figured promi-
nently in employment discrimination cases under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,'" as well as in the areas of jury discrimination and
irregular elections. A typical kind of legal fact-finding probability question
is: what is the probability of obtaining a sample group, such as a jury, of a
" For a review of some of Finkelstein's innovative models, see Brilmayer & Kornhauser,
Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 116 (1978).
12 See note 5 supra.
" See Hallock, Numbers Game-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litiga-
tion, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 5 (1977); Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee
Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1977);
Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and
Rebuttal, 89.l-arv. L. Rev. 387 (1975).
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particular composition from an unbiased selection from a given popula-
tion? If the court relies on intuition to answer such a question, serious
errors in the assessment are likely because there are systematic fallacies in
intuition not encountered in appropriate mathematical calculation. The
likelihood and gravity of these errors are explored in the following sec-
tions, followed by a defense of Finkelstein's methods of calculation.
A. Jury Composition: Probability of Particular Racial Underrepresentation
One of the most prominent of the probabilistic legal problems is
whether a particular underrepresentation of a racial minority on juries
reflects an intentional exclusion of that group or reflects a likely outcome
of a random selection process. The relevant legal question, as gradually
formulated by the Supreme Court, 4 is whether this deviation from the"expected" percentage representation is sufficiently unlikely to happen by
chance alone that the inference of intentional discrimination is sup-
ported.' 5 The Supreme Court has even suggested in dicta that if the
result is extreme, the numerical discrepancy alone may be sufficient to
infer intentional racial discrimination in jury cases.' 6
The fact-finding problem then becomes one of assessing the rareness of
a particular result. In the absence of guidance provided by counsel,"7
courts have had to rely on intuitive estimates of likelihood. The difficulty
with reliance on intuition is that individuals tend to make systematic
errors in estimating probabilities. Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky have studied extensively the nature of subjective probabil-
ity judgments and conclude that "people do not follow the principles of
probability theory in judging the likelihood of uncertain events"' 8 because
the laws of chance are not intuitively apparent. They note further that
"the deviations of subjective from objective probability seem reliable,
systematic and difficult to eliminate. Apparently, people replace the laws
14 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967);
Cassell v. Texas 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
11 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), clarified that in order to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination in the selection of jurors, a defendant must show (1) that the
group discriminated against is a distinct class, (2) that the group is underrepresented over. a
substantial period of time, and (3) that the selection process is not racially neutral or is
susceptible to be used as a tool of discrimination. Id. at 494-95. This discussion goes to the
proof of part (2) of these elements. See also Rose v. Mitchell, 99 S. Ct. 2993, 3005 (1979).
16 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493-94 (1977) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 241 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-65 (1977)). The distinction made by the court in Castaneda is that although an official act
is not unconstitutional solely because it has a disproportionate impact, nonetheless a clear
pattern of intentional discrimination can appear from the statistics themselves. 430 U.S. at
493-94.
17 For a trial judge's lament on the failure of counsel to do an adequate job of interpreting
statistics for the court in any manner "other than the crudest fashion," see Garrett v. R. J.
Reynolds Indus., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 25, 32-33 & n.9 (M.D.N.C. 1978).
18 Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3
Cognitive Psych. 430, 431 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kahneman].
1979]
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of chance by heuristics, which sometimes yield reasonable estimates and
quite often do not."'19
What, for example, is the likelihood of obtaining only four percent
blacks on juries when blacks constitute twenty percent of the registered
voters eligible for jury duty? Is this discrepancy sufficiently large to reflect
a systematic exclusion of blacks, or is it a difference that could easily
happen by chance alone? The most common approach taken by judges in
such cases has been to subtract the two percentages and intuit whether
this difference is large. The Supreme Court used this approach in Swain
v. Alabama 20 in 1965, and concluded that a difference of only ten percent-
age points was not sufficient to amount to a constitutional violation.
Although the Supreme Court has used other assessments since Swain,2 t
that method continues to be used in some circuits. 22
The difficulty with the Swain method of assessing the discrepancy be-
tween the expected and the observed number of black jurors is that it
obtains inconsistent results among cases. This "percentage point discrep-
ancy" approach fails to take into account either the size of the sample of
jurors in question or the difference between a large or small representa-
tion of eligible blacks. A difference of ten percentage points is much rarer
in a large sample than in a small one.2 3 Similarly, a difference of ten per-
centage points is much rarer when the minority group is a small percent-
age of the eligible voters than it is when the minority representation
approaches one half.2 4
The studies of Kahneman and Tversky2" explain why factfinders
naturally would tend to adopt a strategy such as the misleading ten
percentage point discrepancy approach. Their research indicates that
individuals tend to ignore crucial differences in sample size when assess-
ing intuitively the likelihood of particular results. Objectively, however,
sample size is an indispensable piece of information; eighty percent heads
when flipping a coin is not an unusual result if there are only five flips,
but. it is an extremely rare result if there are a million flips. That
19 Id.
20 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1965).
21 See note 15 supra.
22 See, e.g., Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d
1121 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 849 (1979); Berry v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); Blackwell v. Thomas, 476
F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1973).
2" See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra.
24 Assume, for example, minority representation is only 10% in the population and out of
a sample of 100 people from this population there are no minorities. The differ-
ence is 10 percentage points. The probability of such a result this extreme or more so is less
than 1 in 500.
On the other hand, assume that minority representation in the population is 40% and out
of a sample of 100 from this population, 30% or 30 of the minority are found.
The difference in percentages is again 10 but the probability of a result this extreme or more
so by chance alone is approximately 1 in 17.
25 Kahneman, supra note 18, at 437-45.
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property of sampling is easily agreed upon in principle, but apparently
individuals consistently ignore it when they are asked to make estimates.
In one study by Kahneman and Tversky, for example, people were
asked to consider the numbers of baby boys and girls born daily in small,
medium and large hospitals. In the small hospital 10 babies are born a
day, so one would expect an average of 5 boys a day. In the medium sized
hospital 100 babies are born a day, so one would expect an average of 50
boys. In the large hospital, 1000 babies are born a day, making an
expected average of 500. The researchers told individuals about one of
these hypothetical hospitals and then asked them to estimate how
many days a year one would expect to find various deviations from the
expected average number of boys. In the medium sized hospital situation,
for example, the questions would be: on what percentage of days in a year
will the number of boys among 100 babies be up to 5? 5 to 15? 15 to 25?
and so forth. The individuals were thus asked to generate distributions of
what they estimated would be the relative frequency of particular devia-
tions from the expected average number of boys overall.
The rather startling result of this study was that people tend to estimate
the same degree of deviation regardless of the size of the hospital. For
example, 5-15 percent boys was deemed as likely to happen on the same
number of days in a small hospital with 10 babies a day- I boy out of 10
babies-as in a large hospital with 1000 babies a day-50-150 boys out of
1000 babies. Objectively this difference in sample size-10 versus 1000-is
crucial because in the large sample there is a greater opportunity for daily
averaging; in a large hospital there may be more of one sex born in any
given hour, but by the end of the day the 1000 babies will probably be
very close to 500 boys and 500 girls. When only 10 babies are born a day,
however, there is less chance to average out by the end of the day, so on
any given day there may be greater deviation from the expected average
of 5.
The researchers attributed this failure of individuals to account subjec-
tively for sample size to an overreliance on the "representativeness" of the
sample result. There is a universal mental curve of an imagined typical
degree of variance from the average, and that representation assumes as
much variance in large samples as in small ones. 26 Thus, individuals
erroneously estimated that 200 boys and 800 girls would happen as often
in the large hospital as 2 boys and 8 girls would happen in the small
hospital. 27
In the jury discrimination cases the same fallacy would lead most people
to conclude that if a minority group were represented on juries to a
degree within 10 percentage points of their availability-the expected
26 Id. at 444.
27 The probability of the 200 and 800 split, or one even more extreme, at the large
hospital is far less than one in a billion. At the small hospital, however, the probability of a
split as extreme as 2 and 8 or more so is about 1 in 9.
1979]
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average-the result would not be very rare. In objective terms the differ-
ence in percentages is insufficient information on which to make a judg-
ment: sample size makes the key difference. When the sample size is
large, as it often is in jury discrimination cases, a difference of a few
percentage points may be very unlikely to happen by chance alone.
Perceiving the need for more objective measurement of the degree to
which a minority is underrepresented on juries, Finkelstein suggests the
use of a straightforward calculation of the binomial probability involved in
such cases. His explanation of this calculation originally appeared in a
1966 article,"' and it is now reprinted prominently in Quantitative Methods in
Law. The article has been widely cited by federal courts at all levels.2 9 It
remains an outstanding contribution to the evidentiary law of jury dis-
crimination cases.
The analysis Finkelstein employs is based on hypothesis testing: what is
the probability of obtaining an underrepresentation of a minority group
on juries as extreme or more so than the one in question if it is true that
persons are chosen from the available pool without bias?3 0 If the probability
of the result happening by chance alone is very low-below a chosen
critical level, often one in twenty or 0.05-then the result is deemed to be
statistically significant. The value of this approach is that it provides a
direct answer to the question of how rare is the underrepresentation if the
selection process is truly random. A court may then use this information
as it sees fit in determining whether there has been unlawful discrimina-
tion against the minority group.
Finkelstein's use of the statistical significance approach has drawn criti-
cism in one scholarly article3 1 on basically two grounds: that it is difficult
to visualize the test, and that jury discrimination cases are improperly
treated as sampling situations.3 2 The first objection, the difficulty in apply-
28 Finkelstein, supra note 4.
29 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977); Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545, 552 n.2 (1967); Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d 272, 278 n.16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1076 (1972); Gibson v. Blair, 467 F.2d 842, 844 n.1 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 568-69 n.1 1(1st Cir. 1970); Witcher v. Peyton, 405 F.2d 725, 726 n.3
(4th Cir. 1969); Goins v. Allgood, 391 F.2d 692, 699 n.6 (5th Cir. 1968).
30 For additional information on the nature of hypothesis testing in applied statistics, see
H. Blalock, Social Statistics 151-66 (2d ed. 1972); L. Horowitz, Elements of Statistics for
Psychology and Education 157-71 (1974).
31 Kairys, Kadane & Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source
Lists, 65 Cal. L. Rev. 776, 794 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kairys].
32 Id. The authors' view that the jury cases are not properly characterized as sam-
pling situations causes them to object that sample size differences play too large a role in
Finkelstein's method. They state that the use of significance tests are inappropriate because:
The source is not the result of drawing from a population but a list or combination of
lists compiled for other purposes andby other means, and the pool is the result of a
drawing from the source ... . [T]he relevant question is whether the source or pool
provides an adequate cross section of the community, not whether it is a random sample
of the community.
Id. at n.101. As such, they advocate the use of the comparative disparity test to provide a
standard for comparing the similarity of two separate distributions rather than the use of
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ing the concept, overstates the complexity of the calculation 3 3 and under-
states the abilities of the judiciary. Whatever method of analysis is used,
accuracy and reliability must be considered more compelling than simplic-
ity.
More importantly, the critics assert that the statistical significance test is
inappropriate in jury cases because the appropriate legal question to ask is
whether the source pool or juries are representative of the population, not
whether there has been any purposeful discrimination in the selection
process. 34 To date, the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutional
question as one of discrimination, not representation, as the critics fully
acknowledge. 35 Their alternative analysis must therefore be viewed as an
innovative suggestion on how to approach the formulation of the legal
issue and not as a responsive approach to the legal question as it is
presently conceived. Discrimination questions involve a sampling pro-
cess--drawing smaller groups from a larger one supposedly without
bias. As such, Finkelstein's method is superior to other available alterna-
tives.3 6
Finkelstein's model. Finkelstein tests whether the jury source or pool was randomly-without
bias-drawn as a sample from the larger relevant population. Thus the authors' objection to
the effect of sample size is inextricably tied to their objection to a sampling model. For
further discussion of which model most directly addresses the legal issue see, notes 34-36
infra.
13 See M. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 34-35.
3' Kairys, supra note 31, at 779-83.
35 Id. at 785-86.
36 Kairys lists four approaches to measuring representativeness, not discrimination. The
first is the absolute disparity rule used in Swain, discussed at notes 20-24 and accompanying
text supra. Kairys agrees that the absolute disparity rule is inadequate both legally and
mathematically. Kairys, supra note 31, at 789-90, 793-94. They also reject the statistical
significance test advocated by Finkelstein for the reasons discussed in notes 32-35 supra;
basically, they find it an inadequate measure of representativeness. The other two approaches
they list are the "comparative disparity" standard and the "proportion of eligibles" standard.
They note that these two approaches are directly related mathematically and logically. Of
these two, the authors prefer the comparative disparity measure, which shows the reduced
probability of a group member's serving on a jury. Kairys, supra note 31, at 790-92.
Although it is beyond the scope of this review to evaluate in detail the comparative
disparity standard as a measure of discrimination, not representation, its shortcomings lie in
basically two areas: its failure to account for sample size differences which are crucial
differences in sampling models and its failure to handle differences in the magnitude of the
underrepresentation. As an illustration of the magnitude problem, consider two equally
sized towns with different racial compositions: Town A is 10% black but Town B is 80%
black. Assume that 1,000 people serve as jurors in both towns of equal sample size. In Town
A, 8.5%, or 85 of the jurors are black instead of the expected 10%, or 100. In Town B, 69%,
or 690 of the jurors are black instead of the expected 80%, or 800. The difference in the
magnitude of underrepresentation is much greater in Town B-a difference of one or two
blacks fewer than expected on the average on every jury panel. Viewed as a discrimination
problem using Finkelstein's approach, Town A's underrepresentation would be found likely
to have happened by chance alone, with about one chance in eight of this result happening
without bias in the selection; Town B's underrepresentation of blacks, however, is highly
unlikely to happen by chance alone, with a probability far less than one in a million. Using
the comparative disparity approach with a 15% allowable underrepresentation, as advocated
by Kairys, results in opposite conclusions: Town A would be found to be unconstitutionally
underrepresenting blacks and Town B would not. Whether this result is defensible under a
representation model remains to be settled by the courts, but it should not be considered a
19791
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B. Elections: Irregular Votes
Another legal question that has a probability component concerns
whether an election should be overturned when the presence of irregular
votes is established. Finkelstein addressed this problem in part of his 1973
article on voting,37 now appearing as chapter four in his book. His discus-
sion centers on a series of New York cases where the number of irregular
votes exceeded the margin of victory of the winning candidate in a
primary election.3 8 The legal problem was whether the presence of the
irregular votes was likely to have affected the outcome of the primary,
thus necessitating a new election.
The standard articulated by the New York Court of Appeals for decid-
ing whether to invalidate the election was if the "irregularities are
sufficiently large in number to establish the probability that the result
would be changed .... 39 Finkelstein notes that the standard was then
implemented by an intuitive assessment of the probability of a different
result, and he suggests instead that the probability should be calculated
with more precision. 40
The difficulty in estimating the likelihood of an election reversal if the
irregular votes are removed is similar to the problems in assessing the
cases involving the underrepresentation of a minority group on juries. If
one starts with the assumption that the votes are expected to be split
equally between the two neck-and-neck primary candidates-an assump-
tion which clearly is not warranted if there is any evidence of fraud in the
irregular votes-then the question becomes: how likely is it that a large
enough deviation from the expected split of the votes would overtake the
winner's margin of victory?
Finkelstein characterizes the problem as similar to drawing colored
marbles out of an urn. The different colors reflect votes for the different
candidates. Some of the marbles have been put in the urn erroneously-
the irregular votes-and must be withdrawn. There is no way of knowing
the exact numbers of each color-or irregular votes-that must be with-
drawn, so the process of withdrawing them is governed by chance, unless
there is reason to suspect a pattern in the votes cast irregularly. If the
good approach to discrimination questions under the present law. These objections to the
comparative disparity model for discrimination analysis-its failure to account for sample
size and its problem handling different magnitudes of difference-are similar to the prob-
lems encountered with another arbitrary rule of thumb for assessing discrimination, the
"four-fifths rule" used by the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. See,
e.g., Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under
Title VII, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 793 (1978). Unfortunately the comparative disparity approach
has appeared occasionally in the discrimination context. See Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805
(5th Cir. 1975) (Appendix at 811-37).
17 See note 6 supra.
" DeMartini v. Power, 27 N.Y.2d 149, 262 N.E.2d 857, 314 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1970); San-
tucci v. Power, 25 N.Y.2d 897, 252 N.E.2d 128, 304 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1969); Ippolito v. Power,
22 N.Y.2d 594, 241 N.E.2d 232, 294 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1968); Nodar v. Power, 18 N.Y.2d 697,
220 N.E.2d 267, 273 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1966), 294 N.Y.S.2d 209, 211.
11 Ippolito v. Power, 22 N.Y.2d 594, 597, 241 N.E.2d 232, 233 (1968).40 M. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 120-28.
HeinOnline -- 59 B.U. L. Rev. 590 1979
BOOK REVIEW
judge has accepted the premise that there is no pattern, then the fact-
finding task is to assess the probability that once the irregular marbles
have been withdrawn randomly, the remaining marbles in the urn repre-
senting the winner's votes will continue to outnumber the remaining
marbles representing the opponent's votes. That probability will clearly
vary with the winner's margin of victory and the number of votes that
have to be withdrawn.
Intuitive estimates of the probability of the irregular votes changing the
election's outcome are subject to the same problem of sample size differ-
ences noted previously in the jury discrimination discussion. 4' Finkelstein
notes two New York cases which one judge deemed as "almost identical"
in facts. 42 In one, however, the number of irregular votes was 109 and the
winner's margin of victory was 27 votes. 43 In the other, the number of
irregular votes was 136 and the winner's margin was 62 votes. 44 The
probability of the irregular votes determining the election in the first case
was calculated by Finkelstein to be approximately one in a hundred. In
the second situation, he found the probability to be less than one in a
million. Whether this difference would have been persuasive to the judi-
cial factfinder is unknown because apparently such information was not
made available to the court. The greater precision offered by Finkelstein's
recommended calculation 45 would undoubtedly be useful for the judge to
see 46 since the facts of the two cases were not "almost identical" from a
statistical point of view.
III. DANGERS IN INNOVATIVE MODELS FOR THE INTUITIVE FACTFINDER
The focus of the preceding section of this review has been on the value
of providing a precise method of calculating probabilities when the ex-
press legal question is phrased in straightforward terms of probability.
Such responsive uses of quantitative methods, such as in the jury dis-
crimination cases, provide more accurate and consistent results. There are
dangers inherent in more innovative uses of statistical methods in the
4' See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
42 M. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 120-28.
41 Ippolito v. Power, 22 N.Y.2d 594, 596, 241 N.E.2d 232, 233, 294 N.Y.S.2d 209, 211
(1968).44 DeMartini v. Power, 27 N.Y.2d 149, 151, 262 N.E.2d 857, 857, 314 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610
(1970).
4 Finkelstein's method of analysis, like the one he employs in jury discrimination cases, is
based on sampling: what is the probability that the true composition of the irregular votes-a
sample from all the possible combinations of votes-would be as extreme as necessary to
cause a reversal in the election? If the probability is below the critical value, such as 0.05, the
court may choose to characterize the chance as too rare. The calculation is different from
the one in Finkelstein's jury chapter, because it is based on a hypergeometric distribu-
tion, appropriately accounting for the fact that the sampling is without replacement from a
finite pool. This adjustment is necessary particularly when the number of votes is small, but
when large numbers are involved the binomial distribution, as used for the jury discrimina-
tion analysis, could be used without serious error. See H. Blalock, supra note 30, at 170-72.
46 Finkelstein notes that in DeMartini v. Power, 22 N.Y.2d 594, 241 N.E.2d 232
314 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1968), the New York Court of Appeals had the assistance of statisti-
cal analysis in the appellant's brief when it reversed the Appellate Division in that case.
M. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 124 & n.35.
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courtroom, however. One danger is that an innovation in finding an
answer can have the effect of altering the legal question. 47 Another
danger is that the introduction of probability to correct intuitive errors in
only one part of a fact-finding process may actually compound the effect
of other uncorrected intuitive errors."' An illustration of this process is in
the following discussion of Finkelstein's suggested use of Bayes' theorem
for the integration of forensic evidence with other evidence in criminal
trials.
Finkelstein was inspired for this chapter on criminal evidence by the
work of Kahneman and Tversky. 49 These researchers have found, in
another series of studies, that individuals tend to ignore background
information on relative probabilities and rely instead on information
relating directly to stereotyped notions.5 0 In one study, for example,
Kahneman and Tversky asked subjects to indicate the likelihood that a
particularly described person was an engineer or a lawyer. Subjects were
told that a group of seventy lawyers and thirty engineers were in a group
and that thumbnail descriptions were made on each of the one hundred.
The description of one person included information that he was married
with four children, conservative, uninterested in politics and enjoyed
home carpentry as a hobby. Because this information fits with a stereo-
typed image of an engineer more than a lawyer, the subjects tended to
ignore the fact that far more lawyers than engineers were included in the
original group. This reliance on stereotypes persisted even when the
source of the information used was generally considered worthless.51
Noting such findings, Finkelstein wrote an article in 1970,52 now chap-
ter three in Quantitative Methods in Law, advocating the use of Bayes'
theorem to assist jurors in criminal trials when they must integrate prior
evidence of guilt with some other probabilistic evidence, such as the
probability that the defendant's fingerprint was found on the murder
weapon. The hypothetical case he used involved a defendant charged
with murdering his girlfriend. The evidence included a violent quarrel
between the deceased and the defendant the night before, a history of the
defendant striking the deceased and a partial fingerprint. Expert tes-
timony on the fingerprint indicates that the partial print matches that of
the defendant, and such prints appear in no more than one case in one
thousand. The technique Finkelstein advocates to integrate this quantita-
tive evidence with the nonquantitative testimony is use of Bayes' theorem.
Jurors would determine their degree of belief in the defendant's guilt
without the fingerprint evidence, such as one in four, and then with the
See Tribe, supra note 5. See also the discussion of models of jury representativeness
versus jury discrimination at notes 31-36 and accompanying text supra.
48 See text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
49 M. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 71-72.50 Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 Psychological Rev. 237, 239
(1973).
51 Id. at 241-43.
52 Finkelstein, supra note 5.
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assistance of expert testimony would be told how that prior probability
combines with the one in a thousand fingerprint statistic. If the prior
assessment was one in four, for example, the combined probability could
be seen to be 997 out of 1000. As Finkelstein notes, this high combined
probability is likely to be surprising to jurors because of the natural
tendency to underestimate combinatorial effects.5 3
Aside from any objection that this process may have changed the nature
of the trial,54 there is a hidden danger in this approach that might lead
jurors to overestimate the base rate probabilities on which Finkelstein's
use of Bayes' theorem relies. The process of overestimating the base rate,
also found in the work by Kahneman and Tversky, is explained in the next
section. Then, the final section in this review explains why these conflict-
ing intuitive biases produce an undesirable result in Finkelstein's
hypothetical trial.
A. Errors in Base Rate Estimation
One kind of probabilistic task performed by legal decisionmakers in-
volves the estimation of base rates of probability. This task is in contrast to
the previously discussed problems of assessing deviations from established
base rate expected values. Situations involving tossing coins, the birth of
baby boys versus girls, or the distribution of minorities on juries all have
established base rates, such as half of coin flips are expected to be heads,
from which a certain degree of deviation occurs. Often there is no base
rate already established from which one can ascertain rareness, so the
base rate must be estimated. For example, how likely is it that a car will
roll downhill unless the driver failed to set the handbrake? Individuals
must assess frequency from experience, which involves thinking of in-
stances of the event and then determining frequency from how easily
instances come to mind. When asked to estimate the divorce rate, for
example, one thinks of how many acquaintances have recently obtained
divorces and then makes a large or small estimate accordingly. 55
Researchers Kahneman and Tversky have found that this estimation
process is subject to serious bias. It was previously noted that they iden-
tified one source of bias in making subjective probability assessments as an
excessive natural reliance on the supposed representativeness of certain
configurations. A second source of bias emerges in estimating probability
from frequencies when certain events are more easily recalled than oth-
ers. Airplane crashes are such noteworthy events that they tend to remain
salient in -individuals' minds. Thus, the probability of airplane crashes
tends to be overestimated. Similarly, the likelihood of a nuclear accident
would be subjectively overestimated immediately following such an acci-
11 M. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 92-93 n.57. See also, Kaplan, Decision Theory and the
Factfinding Process, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1065, 1084-86 (1968).
4 See the Finkelstein-Tribe debate, supra note 5.
5 Tversky, supra note 1, at 208.
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dent, or following a popular movie making such an event a more salient
possibility in people's minds. 56
One study that illustrates this type of bias derived from the use of this
availability heuristic involved asking people whether there are more words
beginning with the letter "k" or having "k" in the third letter position.
Individuals consistently responded that there are more words beginning
with "k," such as kick, than having "k" in the third position, such as like.
A systematic count, however, reveals that "k" appears as the third letter
about twice as often as the first letter in a word. Individuals were biased in
their estimates by the greater ease with which one can think of words
starting with certain letters than words with those letters in the middle.57
This tendency to judge frequency by the availability of instances that
come to mind easily affects other kinds of estimates as well. Individuals
asked to estimate quickly a numerical expression such as 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4
x 3 x 2 x 1 judge the answer larger than the expression 1 x 2 X 3 x 4 x 5 x
6 x 7 x 8. The researchers found that in their study the average guess for
the first expression, with the numbers in descending order, was 2250. The
average guess for the numbers in ascending sequence was 512. Both
answers were gross underestimates of the actual calculated answer, which
is 40,320. The researchers explain this difference between the descending
and ascending orders as a bias caused by extrapolating from the first
available numbers.5 8 The results of the first few steps in the multiplication
for the descending order suggest to the estimator that the final result is
going to be relatively large, whereas the first few steps in the ascending
order-i x 2 is 2, then 2 x 3 is 6-suggest incorrectly that the overall
expression is going to be small.5 9
This selectivity bias occurs even among those trained as professionals in
the subject matter in question. In another study Kahneman and Tversky
found that clinical psychologists would overestimate the likelihood of
suicide by a depressed patient. The overwhelming majority of depressed
patients never commit suicide, but suicide is a dramatic and memorable
event and is thus easily called to mind when estimating the probability of
suicide. The researchers speculate that the same process is likely to bias
the intuitive predictions of other professionals as well, such as stockbrok-
ers, sportscasters, political analysts, or research psychologists. 60 Lawyers,
16 Id. at 230.
51 Id. at 211-12.
51 Id. at 215-16.
59 Finkelstein argues for greater precision in legal fact-finding tasks involving related kinds
of numerical estimates in his chapter on administrative rate making. Using an example of
administrative rate setting, he maintains that if the agency decisionmakers wish to consider
such factors as comparative differences in risks among regulated utilities, intuition provides
a poor guide for arriving at well-informed decisions. The chapter details the possible use of
regression analysis in such cases and notes that unlike intuitive methods, no valuable
information from the data needs to be discarded in order to reduce the numbers to
manageable terms. M. Finkelstein, supra note 3, chapter 7 ("Regression Models in Adminis-
trative Proceedings") originally appearing in 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1442 (1973).
60 Tversky, supra note 1, at 227-30.
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judges and juries are prone to the same fallacies too; professionalism and
good intentions do not appear to be sufficient to overcome these natural
biases.
B. Compounding Biases: A Solution Providing No Cure
The work of Kahneman and Tversky described in this review has
identified two devices relied upon by individuals to obtain estimates of
likelihood. The availability heuristic was shown to influence judgments
about the frequency of events in that an event is deemed more frequent,
and thus more probable, if instances are easily recalled. 61 The other
heuristic, representativeness, leads individuals to judge events as more
probable if they comport with stereotyped ideas about commonness.6 2
Judgments based on these biases are sometimes reasonable, but often they
result in severe and systematic errors in estimation.
One feature of individuals' reliance on the representativeness heuristic
that Finkelstein noted in particular is the tendency to ignore background
information on relative probabilities and to rely instead on information
relating directly to stereotyped notions.13 This problem inspired Finkel-
stein to propose the use of Bayes' theorem in criminal trials to assist jurors
in integrating evidence. In his example jurors would assess the prior
probability of the defendant's guilt based on testimony concerning mat-
ters such as the previous fight between the victim and the defendant.
Then Bayes' theorem is used to integrate that assessment with the prob-
abilistic fingerprint evidence.
It is true that the research Finkelstein cites indicates that individuals are
poor at integrating prior probabilities with new evidence. It is also likely
that jurors would underestimate the combined probabilities. Finkelstein's
solution, however, requires jurors to perform a task in which they are
likely to overestimate the defendant's guilt if the evidence comports with
sterotyped notions concerning murders or murderers. The Finkelstein
approach requires jurors to estimate the prior probability of guilt based
on the nonquantitative evidence about the fight the night before and the
history of striking the girlfriend. The bias created by the availability
heuristic would tend to make jurors overestimate the defendant's guilt
based on the evidence. Even though most boyfriends who quarrel or
strike their girlfriends do not then murder them, instances where such
events do lead to murder are likely to be more salient in the jurors' minds.
More salient events are estimated as more frequent ones, so the probative
value of this evidence is likely to be overestimated. 64
The effect of overestimating the probability of prior guilt counter-
balances to some degree the effect of underestimating the combinatorial
effect of the fingerprint evidence. Although there is no way of being sure
61 See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
6 See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
63 See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
64 See notes 55-60 and accompanying text supra.
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that the resulting verdict from these combined intuitive processes is statis-
tically defensible, it seems unwise in any event to tamper with only one
part of this double estimation process. In a case such as the hypothetical
one dealt with by Finkelstein, it would appear that, all other consid-
erations aside, half a cure for the fallacies of the human estimation biases
is worse than no cure at all.
IV. CONCLUSION
Michael Finkelstein's book Quantitative Methods in Law should be recog-
nized as .making a significant contribution to an overly neglected area of
the law. His responsive and innovative uses of statistics to address legal
questions deserve close attention by all those considering fresh ap-
proaches to old as well as new problems. This review has focused primar-
ily on the responsive uses of probability identified in various parts of
Finkelstein's work. These uses have been contrasted with the results ob-
tained when the factfinder relies on intuitive estimates of probability.
Biases emerging from the natural process of estimation have been iden-
tified and this review has argued that these biases should not be allowed to
dictate results when the appropriate legal question is a probabilistic one.
On the other hand, it is urged that statistics should not be introduced to
correct the biases of a criminal jury in a case such as the one hypothesized
in the Finkelstein-Tribe debate because the correction process itself fails
to eliminate a countervailing bias against the defendant.
Finkelstein's work accentuates some important issues in the legal fact-
finding process. Although some of his innovative uses of statistics are
highly controversial, the issues he raises are worthy of careful considera-
tion by the legal profession. Particularly noteworthy are his suggestions on
how to approach with greater precision those legal questions that are
essentially probabilistic ones. Subjective estimations are prone to serious
errors and are a poor substitute for more exact calculation.
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